Crisis Action Planning



Armed Forces Staff College National Defense University

USMC Fitness Report Criteria (1950s)

- a. Makes no errors or mistakes
- b. Makes few errors or mistakes, etc.

"I don't want an officer on my staff who never makes an error or a mistake because I will strongly suspect that he isn't doing anything or blaming his mistakes on someone else."

MajGen Oliver P. Smith, USMC



Adaptability

"A crisis could be so time-critical or a single COA so obvious that the first written directive might be a Deployment or Execute order."

Joint Pub 5-03.1

"We've heard it again and again. America cannot be the world's policeman. Yet, as I've learned time and again, ...when somebody needs a cop, guess who gets called to restore peace?"

Colin L. Powell, General, USA (ret)
Former CJCS

The World Environment

Political

- Diffusion of power
- Political instability

Economic

- Reduced U.S. economic dominance
- Interdependent world economy
- Increased debt burden for third world

Sociological

- Soaring population in LDCs
- Decline in military-age cohorts

Technological

- Rapid advances
- Eroded U.S. supremacy
- Improved weaponry and lethality

Military

- Modern weapons (include NBC) proliferation
- Increased terrorism...low-intensity conflict

What is a crisis?

"A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national security objectives."

Joint Pub 5-03.1

1992

GTMO L.A. **Hurricane Andrew** Counterdrug **Pakistan** SOUTHERN WATCH FIREY VIGIL **PROVIDE HOPE PROVIDE RELIEF PROVIDE PROMISE RESTORE HOPE** Liberia

1991

EASTERN EXIT DESERT STORM PROVIDE COMFORT SEA ANGEL

1990

PROMOTE LIBERTY TOP KICK SHARP EDGE **DESERT SHIELD**

1989

Libya Shootdown NIMROD DANCER **BLADE JEWEL Philippines** JUST CAUSE

DESERT THUNDER

NORTHERN WATCH **ASSURED LIFT JOINT GUARD** (SFOR) SILVER WAKE **GUARDIAN** RETRIEVAL **CAMBODIA** IRAQ

1993

Guam

Operation DENY FLIGHT

Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY (Haiti) SOUTHERN WATCH PROVIDE CONFORT Iraq Air Strike Somalia - Rangers Flood Relief

1994

L.A. Earthquake Korea

Bosnia

DISTANT RUNNER SUPPORT HOPE

Cuba

PROVIDE PROMISE

UNISOM II

WILDFIRE SUPPORT

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY VIGILANTE WARRIOR

UNITED SHIELD DELIBERATE FORCE **Hurricane Opal** VIGILANT SENTINEL

IFOR-Bosnia

(Joint Endeavor)

Khobar China Cuba Tower

Korea

ASSURED RESPONSE QUICK RESPONSE

Burundi

Olympics Desert Strike

AFSC JP007c D#32-g

Where's the Next Crisis?



Can we get there from here--in time?

CAP Process Allows

- Rapid exchange of pertinent information
- Analysis of situations affecting possible COAs
- Development of feasible COAs
- Decisionmaking process to select best COAs
- Coordination of plans and orders to implement decisions made

The Players

Government Agencies

White House Situation Room

State Department

OSD

Defense Agencies

> DISA DSWA DLA NIMA

CJCS JCS

Jt Staff

Services

Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps Coast Guard

Intelligence Agencies

> DIA CIA NSA

NMCC

Combatant Commands

Atlantic Command Central Command European Command Pacific Command Southern Command Space Command
Special Operations Command
Strategic Command
Transportation Command

Command and Control


The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.

Communications

Communications is primarily a function of *trust*. When trust is high, communications is easy, it's effortless, it's instantaneous, and it's effective -- it works. But when the trust is low, communications is exhausting, it's terribly time-consuming, and it's like walking around a minefield.

Political-Military Actions and the "Interagency"

NGOs...
PVOs...



Other

Military

Operations

The Interagency Process

Built on Consensus!



The Intent is to take the interests of all Agencies, work the details, and come up with a way that is best for the Nation

PDD-56 President's Intent Complex Contingency

Incorporate proven integrated planning mechanisms and tools in the interagency process on a regular basis to achieve unity of effort among US Government agencies engaged in complex contingency operations.

Complex Contingency

Peace operations such as peace accord implementation -- Bosnia; humanitarian intervention northern Iraq -- Provide Comfort; and foreign humanitarian assistance operations -- Sea Angel 1991.

The Multi-dimensional Tasks

- Diplomatic collaboration
- Cease-fire / Disengagement / Stabilization
- Prisoner exchange
- Weapons control / Demobilization
- Demining
- Humanitarian relief
- Refugee / Displaced person return
- Elections / Democratization
- War crimes tribunal
- Police and criminal justice
- Civil and social order
- Economic restoration

Key Elements of PDD-56

- Executive Committee
- Political-Military Implementation Plan
- Interagency Rehearsal
- AAR
- Training

Implementation Plan - Outline

- Assessments
 - Situation
 - US Interests
- Mission, objective, endstate
- Concept of operations and organization
- Preparatory Tasks
- Major Functional Tasks
- Agency Tasks

Infra structure/Economic Tasks

Internal Political Tasks

Public Security/Law-Order Tasks

Humanitarian Assistance Tasks

Avoid generation of population movements from

home

- Provid
- Provid
- Organi
- •Coordi
- Repatr
- Provid
- Assist
- •Prepos

Military Tasks

•Assess, train, and equip coalition forces

- Conduct m
- Provide int
- •Establish n
- Implement
- Demobilize
- Demilitariz
- Profession


Diplomatic Tasks

- •Collaborate with the UN and other regional organizations
- Consult with the host nation and other governments
- Consult with supporting international organizations
- Coordinate with "Friends Groups"
- •Mediate and negotiate with the parties to the conflict
- •Impose or lift sanctions
- Conduct war crimes investigations
- •Maintain compliance with peace accords and conditions
- Appoint Special Envoy
- •Gain diplomatic recognition of a government

Political-Military Tasks ... in the detail

Expected Results


- Identify appropriate missions and tasks
- Develop effective strategies early on
- Rapidly identify critical disconnects
- Accelerate civilian component planning and implementation
- Resolve critical resource shortfalls
- Achieve integrated plans at strategic level



Theater Key Players

- POLAD
- Ambassador
 - Country Team
 - DAO
 - Security Assistance Organization
- USAID
- OFDA
- Others...

Operational Integration: the CMOC



"A Civil-military operations center can serve as the primary interface between all humanitarian organizations and military forces."

JTF Handbook for Peace Operations

Issues

Routine Problems

- ➤ Late Agendas . . . or None
- ➤ Inadequate Time to Prepare Principals
- Routine By Passing of Chain
- ➤ Papers Often Provided on Short Notice
- All of the Above Cause Staffing Friction

CAP Issues/Questions

- Forces what's available
- Mission Objectives?
- End State when are we done?
 - Exit strategy?
- Coordination -- it takes time
- Interagency consensus it takes time
- Consulting more with Congress

Deciding to Intervene

- How did we get where we are?
- Mission/Objective
- Alternative means to achieve objective
- Tolerance for what level of violence?
- Support for use of force
- Financial and logistical
- Exit strategy
- Definition of victory

JOPES

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System



Selection

Time-Sensitive **Planning**

Campaign Plan **OPORDs**





CINC Assessment


- Information on situation
- Action being taken within ROE
- Forces available (req for msg)
- Timeframe for commitment of forces
- Major constraints or restraints for employment of forces
- COAs under consideration (if any)

Crisis Action Planning Checklists

- Contained in Annex A to JOPES Vol I
- List general responsibilities and considerations during each CAP phase
- Identified for various levels
 - -- CJCS
 - supported command
 - component commands
 - supporting commands
 - -- Services
 - USTRANSCOM
 - other commands and agencies

Phase I Situation Development





Force Preparation Considerations

- Consider secrecy and surprise
- Need to reduce reaction time
- Deployment or deployment preparation order issued by CJCS to
 - increase or decrease deployability posture
 - establish a JTF
 - deploy/redeploy forces
 - direct any other action



Phase II Crisis Assessment






Warning Order

- Issued by CJCS at earliest practical time
- Requires Secretary of Defense approval if deployment of forces directed
- Contains
 - -- mission statement
 - objectives
 - expected constraints or restraints (e.g., ROE, overflight, basing, etc.)
 - tentative forces available
 - command relationships
- Requests submission of Commander's Estimate (COAs)

Deployment Database and Crisis Action



Commander's Estimate

- Mission
- Situation and COAs
- Analysis of opposing COAs
- Comparison of own COAs
- Recommended COA

Phase III Course of Action Development





Execution Flexibility

"Maximum flexibility will be left to the supported commander in determining how the commander will carry out the assigned mission and tasks."

Joint Pub 5-03.1

Phase IV Course of Action Selection





Alert Order

- Gives NCA decision on COA selected
- Contains
 - -- situation
 - tasks to be accomplished
 - -- allocation of major combat forces
 - allocation of strategic transport resources
 - target date for execution
- Requests CINC's OPORD

Campaign Plan

"Normally, a campaign plan is completed after the NCA selects the course of action during CAP.

Joint Pub 5-0

Operations Order


"A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation."

Joint Pub 1-02

- Contains
 - situation
 - mission
 - -- execution
 - administration and logistics
 - command and control
- Limits scope: time, area, and purpose

Phase V Execution Planning






Execute Order

- Issued by CJCS on Secretary of Defense authority
- Directs execution
- Contains
 - -- NCA-approved COA
 - -- forces
 - -- coordinating instructions
 - -- execution time
 - -- command relationships
 - other info not previously given

Phase VI Execution



Changes


CAP Orders

	WARNO	PLORD	ALORD	DEPORD	EXORD
PROVIDE RELIEF (Somalia)			X	X	X
PROVIDE COMFORT (N. Iraq)		X	X	X	X
PROVIDE HOPE (Russia)			X	X	
PROVIDE PROMISE (Yugo)	X	X		X	X
ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia)			X		X
Haiti Advisory Group <i>(Haiti)</i>			X		X
VIGILANT WARRIOR (Iraq)			X		X
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY		X	X	X	XX
ASSURED RESPONSE			X		X
QUICK RESPONSE			X		X
DESERT STRIKE				XX	X

Crisis Action Planning Summary

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V	Phase VI
Situation Development	Crisis Assessment	Course of Action Development	COA Selection	Execution Planning	Execution
 Event Occurs Problem recognition CINC's Assessment Report event to NCA/CJCS 	 CINC Assessment received Increased reporting CJCS/NCA evaluation NCA crisis decision 	 Warning Order COAs developed major forces support COAs evaluated Deployment databases established USTRANSCOM component deployment estimates Commander's Estimate sent 	 CJCS refines and presents COAs CJCS provides advice to NCA NCA COA decision 	 Planning and/or Alert Order Deployment database completed OPORD developed Force preparation Deployability posture reporting CINC sends OPORD 	 NCA decision for Execute Order Execute OPORDs Deployment database update Reporting Begin planing to redeploy Crisis resolved

Crisis Action Summary



JOPES

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System



Selection

Time-Sensitive **Planning**

Campaign Plan **OPORDs**

Somalia Lessons Learned

- Don't go into the middle of a civil war, pick a side, and try to make peace
- Don't change the mission midstream
- Define why the mission is in the national interest
- Be sure Congress and the public understand the RISK
- Establish a clear chain of command
- Don't underestimate your adversaries
- Don't underestimate the power of TV

Aggravated Peacekeeping

"The military can freeze a situation. It can create a secure environment. But in the end you've got to change the environment.

The military doesn't change the environment."


Gen Zinni, USMC

Joint Task Force





Forming the JTF

- Standing JTF HQ
- Ad hoc
- Build on a component



Formation of JTF Staff





JTF Augmentation

- Public affairs
- GCCS, JOPES
- LRC, JLCC
- SOF-CA, PSYOP
- Legal
- Host nation
- Liaison
 - Service component
 - Coalition
 - NGO, PVO, OGA
 - TRANSCOM
 - DOD agencies (NIMA, CIA, DIA etc.)
 - USSPACECOM
 - Medical
 - Pol-Mil POLAD
 - JULLS, JAARS
 - Contracting official
 - Establish a CMOC (Civil-Military Operations Center)

C'AP C'ase Studies




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Operation URGENT FURY



October 25, 1983



Grenada: Movement Toward Soviet-Cuban Colony

April 1979-May 1983

- New airport with Cuban aid
- Landing rights to Soviet Union
- Troops to Nicaragua
- Plans for new port and cement plant with Soviet Union aid


Mission Evolved


Naval Presence/Show of Force and Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

Neutralize opposing military forces

FINAL MISSION STATEMENT

"CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO PROTECT AND EVACUATE U.S. AND DESIGNATED FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM GRENADA, NEUTRALIZE GRENADIAN FORCES, STABILIZE THE INTERNAL SITUATION, AND MAINTAIN THE PEACE. IN CONJUNCTION WITH OECS\FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS, ASSIST IN RESTORATION OF A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT ON GRENADA."





Lessons Learned



Operation JUST CAUSE



Crisis in Panama

Operation JUST CAUSE

Objectives

- Safeguard U.S. vital interest
- Restore democratic rule
- Maintain integrity of canal treaty
- Bring Noriega to justice

U.S. strategy

- Seize Noriega
- Take control of PDF
- Secure Panama Canal
- Protect U.S. military installations
- Block Panama City and Colon

Forces	<u> </u>	<u>PDF</u>
In-place	13,000	12,000-15,000
Augmenting	14,000	6,000 military
froops		

JUST CAUSE Chronology

	June 1986	Noriega drug trafficking reported
SITUATION	Jan-Dec 1988	Increased harassment of Americans1,000 plus incidents
DEVELOPMENT	February 1988	Noriega indicted on drug trafficking (13 counts)
	7 May 1989	Elections 3-1 victory for Endara voided 9 May by Noriega
CRISIS ASSESSMENT	11 May 1989	2,000 U.S. troops sent to Panama
	20 July 1989	Gen Thurman replaced Gen Woerner
COA DEVELOPMENT	3 October 1989	Failed coup attempt
	October 1989	SOUTHCOM plan rewritten
COA SELECTION	November 1989	JCS approved JUST CAUSE OPLAN
EXECUTION	15 December 1989	Noriega declared war on United States
PLANNING	16 December 1989	Lt Paz shot and USN officer and wife harassed
	17 December 1989	President Bush issued Execute Order
	19 December 1989	President Endara sworn in
EXECUTION	20 December 1989	Operation JUST CAUSE
	24 December 1989	Noriega turned himself in to Vatican mission
	3 January 1990	Noriega surrendered to U.S. troops

Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned






Middle East Strategic Objectives


- Prevent any Middle East power from achieving hegemony over its neighbors
- Secure an uninterrupted supply of oil at a reasonable price

National Objectives

- Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait
- Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored
- Security and stability must be achieved in Persian Gulf
- American citizens must be protected



USCENTCOM Campaign Plan




Campaign Phases

- Strategic air operations
- II. Air supremacy in KTO
- III. Battlefield preparation
- IV. Ground offensive operations

Campaign Objectives/Phases

Objective		Phase			
Attack leadership & C2					
Gain and maintain air supremacy					
Totally cut Iraq supply lines				IV	
 Destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear capability 					
Destroy Republican Guards				IV	
 Arab forces liberate Kuwait city 				IV	




DESERT SHIELD Lessons Learned

This operation has justified many crucial military decisions made over the past decade

- Airlift
 - Sealift
 - Readiness
 - Modernization
 - Afloat PREPO
 - Forward-deployed forces
 - Reserve forces

DESERT STORM Lessons Learned

- Validated education and training
- Validated tactics and operational philosophies
- Validated leadership
- Technology



"As far as Saddam Hussein being a great military strategist, he is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational art, nor is he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a soldier. Other than that, he's a great military man."

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf




"Haiti is not a one day problem. You have to factor the political, the military, the economic and the cultural into your planning and execution, and then figure out what is done the day after, the week after, the month after, the year after...."

Admiral Paul David Miller, USN CINCUSACOM

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Situation Development	Crisis Assessment	COA Development	COA Selection	Execution Planning	Execution
Dec 90	Oct 93	NEO	3 Jun 94	CJCS briefs	10 Sept 94
Aristide elected	USS		PLANORD	President	EO
	Harlan County				No D-day
				8 Sept	
Sept 91	Peaceful	Verbal	Two Plans	ALERTORD	10 Sept
Military Coup	transition to	Instructions	2380		RC
	Forced Entry		2370		
					13 Sept
Jul 93	SEA SIGNAL			3	OPORD
Governors	ABLE MANNER	No other WO	7 Sept 94		
Island Accord		1 2 m	CINC DO		19 Sept
					CNX EO 2370
					2370 and 2380
					combined
			***///////////////////////////////////		

Campaign Planning



Making The Call



Engaging the Interagency

an Integrated Approach

Urban Service Improvements and Operation Domestic Free Trade and Open Market Initiatives Transportation Infrastructure Improvements International Commerce and Monetary System Legislative Election Monitoring Judicial System Training and Monitoring Electoral System Reform Schools and Basic Literacy Improvements Basic Public Health and Human Service Needs

Lessons Learned (or Relearned)

- Flexible, adaptive planning required
- Early involvement with USG Interagency/UN/GOH
- Political-military annexes to OPLAN
- Plan for police/public security functions
- Ensure SOFA negotiated in advance
- Intelligence sharing with coalition partners
- Sequenced, detailed, multi-tier rehearsals
- Integrate and involve NGO/PVO in process
- Coalitions start with peacetime relationships

Lessons Learned (or Relearned)

- Support begins with Nations Assistance
- Media is critical
- Technology advantages (example: VTCs)
- Anticipate and plan for clear end states
- Understanding UN Peacekeeping procedures
- Expect the unexpected
- Assistance for other Agencies
- Early Reserve involvement in planning
- Multiple Agency/organization LNOs

Lessons Learned

Force Packaging

Force Packaging

Participation

Adaptive Planning

Iraining

Creating Stability

Operations

Operations

Interagency Coordination

Gaining Popular Support

Liaison Officers

Reception

Desert Strike

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V	Phase VI
Situation Development	Crisis Assessment	Course of Action Development	COA Selection	Execution Planning	Execution
	25-28 Aug	Iraq build up			
	28 2	Aug US warn	ing		
	31 /	Aug CJCS DE	PLOYORI		
			31 Aug	- Iraq Atta	cks
			1 Sept (CENT AO -	strike plan
				2 Sept CJC	S EO
			2	Sept EUCC	M EO
			3	Sept CENT	EO
			3	Sept NAVO	ENT EO
			In	itrinsic Ad	tion —

Crisis Action Planning



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